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ABSTRACT 
The protection of legitimate expectations as a general principle of the legal system is not 
known in Hungary. However, some other constitutional propositions play a similar role like 
the protection of “acquired rights” and “legal certainty”. Although during the 1990s, the 
Constitutional Court developed a sophisticated concept of the rules of law, after 2010, when a 
conservative government coalition gained a two-thirds majority, the whole constitutional 
system was transformed. Since then, the level of the protection of individual rights, including 
the legitimate expectations, on behalf of the elusive concept of public interest, has declined. 
The institutional system of constitutional justice has proved to be weak to resist these trends. 
The study describes how the protection of legitimate expectations was developed and 
elucidates the very recent tendencies. The final conclusion of the author is that the Hungarian 
case can be a deterrent example showing what not to do. 
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Introduction 
Today, when the protection of legitimate expectations is a well-admitted principle of the 
European Union law with growing case-law and doctrinal background, it might be surprising 
that this principle does not occur in any Hungarian constitutional or administrative law 
manual or textbook. It cannot be said that the principle has been developed by the high courts, 
either. The protection of legitimate expectations (bizalomvédelem) as a normative concept is 
accepted or used neither in the case law of the Constitutional Court, nor in the jurisprudence 
of ordinary courts proceeding administrative cases; it is solely referred before high courts to 
as a principle of the EU law. It is cited almost exclusively as a tenet of the European Law 
which does not have an equivalent doctrine in the national legal system. However, it cannot 
be said that the principle described in this concept, is not present in the Hungarian public law 
at all. The principles and requirements of the “acquired rights” or “legal certainty” have 
similar characteristics. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that the difference is only in the 
applied legal terminology, and the Hungarian public law uses the same doctrine of the 
European Union law and the Anglo-Saxon countries by another name. 
In this article, first, I will shortly analyse how are (or how are not) defined the concepts of 
legitimate expectations and public interests by domestic law in Hungary. Then I will describe 
the system of protection of legitimate expectations or their proxies in the public law. As we 
will see, the primary field of legal protection is in this country the constitutional law, rather 
than the administrative law. The last chapter deals with the decline of the level of legal 
protection of legitimate expectations in the recent years which can be instructive for all who 
deeply concern with the delicate balance between the values of the protection of legitimate 
expectations and the promotion of public interest. 
Conceptualizing the protection of legitimate expectations and public interest 
Basically, legitimate expectations may be pinned to certain behaviour of public authorities in 
individual cases. Once an administrative act as a legally final decision was taken, all 
stakeholders may legitimately expect its effect and compliance. Actually, an individual 
decision can be understood as a special promise to the private parties of the particular case 
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that the administrative act relating to them will be implemented. And, as time goes by, the 
protection of this kind of expectation may become even stronger. Legitimate expectations can 
also be protected against administrative acts having a retroactive effect,1 because they would 
impose an unjustified burden on private interests. Certainly, citizens cannot be expected to 
respect non-existing rules, so it would be unfair to impose burdens retroactively on them with 
an ex post facto decision.  
Citizens’ expectations can also extend to the implementation of the published public policy in 
general.2 In this case, public trust is not put in an individual decision, but rather, in a whole 
series of earlier administrative acts, or, in the case of appropriate behaviour of public 
authorities until the relevant public policy is changed or withdrawn.  
Finally, the domain of legitimate interests might be even wider, requiring predictable and 
stable legal circumstances in general terms. Legal certainty, which is an indispensable 
element of the rule of law, guarantees that the existing legal regulation can only be changed in 
a rational way, providing enough preparation time for stakeholders.  
Whichever approach is discussed, the protection of legitimate expectations as such is not 
recognized as a principle by the Hungarian public law. Nevertheless, there are some legal 
guarantees and institutions which provide certain kind of protection for legitimate interests of 
private parties, even vis-á-vis the pubic interests represented by state authorities. 
The situation is much the same with the concept of “public interest”. Although the 
institutional system of the protection of public interest is well-established in Hungary,3 the 
concept is very elusive and abstract. Practically, public interest is represented by the policy- 
and law-making authorities, so it is, on most general level, what the law says. It can be said 
that this is a pragmatic view and the existence and the nature of public interest depend on the 
context and circumstances of each case. The protection of legitimate expectations and the 
                                                 
1
 However, some scholars separate the protection of legitimate expectations from the non-retroactivity principle. 
See e.g. Stott, D. and Felix, A., Principles of Administrative Law, London–Sydney, 1997. 276. 
2
 Cane, P., An Introduction to Administrative Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 11, 145. “Legitimate 
expectations means that any individual who, as a result of governmental conduct, holds certain expectations 
concerning future governmental activity, can require those expectations to be fulfilled unless there are 
compelling public interest reasons for not doing so.”  Thomas, R., Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in 
Administrative Law, Oxford-Portland, Hart Publishing, 2000. xv. 
3
 For example, the public prosecutor’s offices have a special function of protecting public interest, and they are 
empowered to bring a case to court or to initiate other (e.g. disciplinary) procedures in order to promote or 
defend public interest. 
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promotion of public interests may conflict with each other in many situations, and they may 
embody opposing interests and efforts.  
It is sure, nevertheless, that the pragmatic approach can be well justified in a country only if 
the principle and practice of separation of powers exist, and all exercise of public power is 
effectively checked and counterbalanced. But it is not the case if public authorities are not 
enforced to justify their decisions and announcements and they can freely determine that what 
kind of interests should be regarded as “public”.  
Forms of the protection of legitimate expectations in Hungarian public law 
The claim for the protection of legitimate expectations may arise in various fields of law and 
in different ways. 
First, if we examine the individual administrative procedures, the level of the protection of 
legitimate expectations is low. According to the ruling approach of Hungarian administrative 
law, legitimate expectations do not have any special role until the case is ultimately decided. 
Moreover, the principle of reformatio in peius prevails, even if the client has appealed. By 
this principle, the administrative authority of second instance is not bound by the decision of 
the public authority delivered in first instance, because “the administrative authorities 
represent the public interest”. Although legitimate interests can be taken into account in 
judicial review procedure, it is not a standard requirement; the court decides whether it gives 
weight to them or not.  
There is a very special institution in Hungarian administrative law where legitimate 
expectations of private clients have a stronger legal protection. The Law on the General Rules 
of Administrative Proceedings and Services of 2004 allows the administrative authority of the 
first instance to enter into an administrative agreement with the client if it is a suitable 
solution for both the public and the concerned private interests.4 In other words, such 
contracts can be concluded in cases where the private parties have a particular interest in 
stable legal or administrative circumstances for a long term. If the administrative agency fails 
to comply with its obligations, the private party may turn to court.  
                                                 
4
 Act No. CXL of 2004. Art. 76-77. 
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As to the judicial case-law, remarkably, although Hungarian courts know the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations, they do not refer to its standard form in administrative 
law cases, except when the EU law is directly applied, or, concerned in other ways (e.g. in 
preliminary ruling cases).5 The outlines of the protection of legitimate expectations appear in 
the administrative case-law, even if not explicitly, but, following the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, in the doctrinal frameworks of legal certainty and acquired rights.  
Legitimate expectations can be taken into attention in individual cases when the competent 
authority has a discretionary power in deciding the case and in those cases when the law 
allows exemptions from legal rules in order to prevent the harsh results of their strict 
application. In these cases, the decision of the administrative authority must comprise the 
criteria and facts employed in the decision-making.6  
In theory, legitimate expectations can be connected to officially announced public policies, or 
the permanent practice of administrative authorities as well. Yet, the existing doctrines of 
Hungarian administrative law do not favor the protection of such kinds of expectations. The 
ruling approach requires only the formal legality of administrative acts for their legal validity, 
while the concept of procedural fairness has remained undeveloped. The principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations does not play any role in the case of the so-called 
“legally binding” administrative acts. In these cases the execution of law is entirely automatic, 
since the relevant legal regulation contains if-then commands for administrative authorities 
excluding any autonomy in decision-making. 
In the course of the judicial review of administrative acts, the courts review the protection of 
legitimate expectations only if it was explicitly determined by law as a criterion of 
consideration beforehand. Probably, it would be regarded as an unreasonable and unjustified 
judicial interference in public administration if the court annulled the decisions of 
administrative authorities referring only to such a general concept as the protection of 
legitimate expectations.  
                                                 
5
 The fact that “the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations form part of the 
Community legal order’, means that ‘these principles must be respected [not only] by the Community 
institutions, but also by Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by Community 
directives”. See Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, Case C-201/08. Para. 43.  
6
 Act No. CXL of 2004, Art. 72, Sect. (1), Para. ec). 
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In Hungary, the protection of legitimate expectations has the most considerable significance 
in constitutional law. As a matter of fact, the relevant constitutional principles have a general 
scope in the whole legal system, so they must be followed in the field of administrative law as 
well. The relevant jurisprudence is built on the principle of rule of law. As the Constitutional 
Court formulated, the interpretation of this principle is the task of the Court, which determines 
the underlying principles gradually, from case to case.7 The Court declared that legal certainty 
is an essential component of the principle of rule of law. The scope of legal certainty means 
that public authorities must exist 
– within their organisational frameworks, and 
– in the operational order determined by law, 
– in a way predictable for the citizens.8 
The prohibition of retroactive (ex post facto) legislation is another requirement of the 
principle of legal certainty. It means that the law cannot sanction (cannot determine legal 
consequence for) any legal action that was committed, or legal relationships that existed 
before its enactment.9  
In another landmark decision, the Constitutional Court declared that the principle of legal 
certainty requires the whole legal system to be clear, unambiguous and predictable.10 This 
principle has been associated with the requirements that procedural guarantees have to be 
established for the stability of the existing legal relationships, the full compliance of the 
procedural rules and that public authorities must operate in a foreseeable and effective way.11 
The Court said also that the requirement of legal certainty imposes the duty on the law-maker 
to introduce a new legislation leaving due time for the concerned persons to prepare for the 
application of the law.12  
                                                 
7 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 9/1992. (I. 30.), ABH 1992. 65. 
8
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 56/1991. (XI. 8.) of the Constitutional Court, ABH 1991. 456. 
9
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 25/1992. (IV. 30.), ABH 1992, 131, 131. 
10
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 9/1992. (I.30.), ABH 1992. 65. 
11
 See for example the Decisions of the Constitutional Court No. 46/2003. (X. 16.), ABH 2003, 488.; 62/2003. 
(XII. 15.), ABH 2003, 647. and 2/2007 (I.24.), ABH 2007, I., 65. 
12
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No.  28/1992. (IV. 30.), ABH 1992, 155, 157. 
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One of the first corollary principles of the legal certainty was the concept of the so-called 
“acquired rights”. The concept of acquired rights emerged mainly in the domain of social 
policy, concerning the legal entitlements for particular social services, provided by law. The 
legal certainty requires, among others, the protection of the acquired rights, a “constitutional 
limitation of the changeability of the long-term legal relations, originating in the past”.13 
However, this principle does not establish an absolute rule or protection.14 The rights and 
entitlements provided by law may be reduced or even abolished, if it is needed for attaining a 
legitimate aim, provided that the underlying public interest exceeds the importance of the 
protection of acquired rights.15 
The decline of the level of protection of legitimate expectations since 2010 
However, the whole construction of the acquired rights, for which the legitimate expectations 
and interests are the core functions, has been destroyed by a wide-ranging social and 
economic legislation since 2010, without the legal opportunity of the Constitutional Court to 
review the constitutionality of the new laws. In that year the general elections brought about 
an overwhelming victory of the former opposition parties, and a new conservative 
government coalition, based on a two-thirds (i.e. constitution-making) parliamentary majority, 
was formed. The government had the opportunity to transform the whole constitutional 
system as well as to engage in comprehensive reforms.16 Since then, almost all formerly 
developed principles have been changed radically, and the level of protection of legitimate 
interests has been dramatically reduced.  
                                                 
13
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 11/1992. (III. 5.), ABH 1992, 81. 
14
 Decisions of the Constitutional Court No. 515/B/1997., ABH 1998, 976, 977.; 1011/B/1999., ABH 2001, 
1365, 1370.; 495/B/2001., ABH 2003, 1382, 1390. 
15
 Decisions of the Constitutional Court No. 43/1995. (VI. 30.), ABH 1995, 188, 192-193. and 62/1993. (XI. 
29.), ABH 1993, 364, 367.; 16/1996. (V. 3.), ABH 1996, 61, 64., 142/2010. (VII. 14.); 3062/2012. (VII. 26.). 
16
 For a more detailed description of this process in English, see Kovács K. and Tóth G. A., Hungary's 
Constitutional Transformation, 7 European Constitutional Law Review, 2011, 183–203.; Jakab A. and 
Sonnevend P., Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary, 1 European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2013, 102–138; Bánkuti, M., Halmai G. and Scheppele, K. L., Disabling the Constitution, 23 Journal of 
Democracy, 2012, 138–146.; Pogány I., The Crisis of Democracy in East Central Europe: The ‘New 
Constitutionalism’ in Hungary, 19 European Public Law, 2013, 341–367.; Müller, J.-W., The Hungarian 
Tragedy, 58 Dissent, 2011, 5–11.; Bánkuti, M., Halmai G. and Scheppele, K. L., From Separation of Powers to a 
Government without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions. In: Tóth G. A. (ed.), Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Budapest–New York, Central European University 
Press, 2012, 237–268. For an apologetic presentation of the new Fundamental Law, see Csink L., Schanda B. 
and Varga Zs. A. (eds.), The Basic Law of Hungary. A First Commentary. Dublin–Budapest, Clarus Press, 
National Institute of Public Administration, 2012. 
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The decline of the protection of legitimate interests can be exemplified by some recent legal 
changes. In 2010 the Parliament enacted a law that imposed a 98 per cent tax on the extreme 
severance payment with retroactive effect. After that the retroactive taxation was declared 
unconstitutional as it violates the principle of the rule of law,17 the government majority 
deprived the Constitutional Court from reviewing the constitutionality of public finance laws. 
Since then the Court has not been able to review and annul the budgetary laws, the acts on 
taxes, duties, pensions, customs or any kind of financial contributions to the state, except 
some extraordinary cases. 
The level of the protection of legitimate expectations was also dramatically reduced in the 
field of civil service law. An amendment of the Law on the Legal Status of Civil Servants18 
introduced in 2010 a new rule that civil servants can be dismissed without any explanation. It 
was a radical change of the regulatory environment, since the previous regulation was based 
on the so-called “closed civil service system”, that is, on a career system with the well-
accepted aim to preserve the skilled and trained civil servants providing secure jobs and 
promotion for them. Although the Constitutional Court declared the new law unconstitutional, 
and ordered that all dismissals have to be explained,19 it did not prove to be an effective 
protection of legitimate expectations for job security, because a prompt new law established 
the “loss of confidence” of the employer as a legitimate reason for dismissal. 
Two years ago, a new legislation abolished the early and privileged pension scheme of some 
groups of public employees, like policemen and firemen. According to the traditional pension 
system, public employees who did hazardous or risky work were entitled to retire after a 
shorter period of service than other employees. These earlier privileges have been abolished 
without any prior consultation or compensation, ignoring the life strategies of the concerned 
people built on these traditional advantages. 
In Hungary, after 1998, certain part of the employees’ mandatory pension contributions 
were paid to several private pension funds for completing the state-run pension system.20 In 
                                                 
17
 Decisions of the Constitutional Court No. 903/B/1990. ABH 1990, 250-251. 
18
 Act No. CLXXIV of 2010 on the amendment of the Act on the Legal Status of Civil Servants (Act No. XXIII 
of 1990). 
19
 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 111/B/2011. 
20 According to this system, the private pension funds would have paid 30 per cent of the total pension of their 
members, while the 70 per cent would have been covered by the state. These funds had about three million 
members, and collected almost three trillion HUF (about 10 per cent of the Hungarian GDP). 
9 
 
2010, the Parliament adopted a law to divert the private pension contributions to the state 
budget, and later, the state took over the assets of private pension funds (confiscating their 
members’ savings), ignoring the legitimate expectations of the members of these funds to 
provide an additional source for their retirement years. 
In 2011, the retirement age of judges was substantially reduced (from 70 to 62) without any 
transition period.21 This measure was explained by the government’s intention to establish 
uniform age limits for retirement for all public employees. In November 2012, the European 
Court of Justice declared that Hungary failed to fulfil her obligations as entrenched in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by radically lowering the age-limit for 
compulsory retirement of judges, because – among others – this measure illegitimately 
violated the “well-founded expectation” of the judges “that they would be able to remain in 
office” until the age limit set by law earlier.22 Nevertheless, no judge has been reinstated in 
his/her original position. 
These examples could be continued. The central government, based on its parliamentary 
majority, and in the absence of the constitutional review of public finance laws, started to 
extend its political and economic control to many spheres of market economy and social life. 
The state has monopolized some spheres of economic activities or institutions, abolishing 
long-term contracts and establishing new public concessions. The untrammelled power of 
taxation has widely been used to impose extraordinary and special taxes on certain economic 
actors and spheres, like in the bank or telecommunication sector. The frequent and 
unpredictable changes in the regulation have ignored the previously established and 
entrenched relationships, and made the previous investments and personal policies 
meaningless and superfluous. All these measures have eroded both the investors’ and the 
citizens’ trust in public institutions. The declared political aim was to redistribute wealth and 
resources and change social and economic elites.   
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Act No. CLXII of 2011.  
22
 European Commission v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, Judgment of 6 November 2012, Para. 67. 
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Conclusion 
In fact, the recent constitutional and political changes have dramatically reduced the quality 
of the rule of law and destroyed the principle of legal certainty.23 All these developments 
have undermined the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in the past few 
years in Hungary. So in the current discourse on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations, the recent developments of the Hungarian legal system can be deterrent 
examples of what not to do. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 See for example Tóth G. A. (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. 
Budapest–New York, Central University Press, 2012.; Kovács K. and Tóth G. A., Ibid. 
